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7 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
8 **FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

9 DIANA SAIKI, individually and on behalf of  
10 all others similarly situated,

11 Plaintiff,

12 v.

13 MCG HEALTH, LLC, a Washington limited  
14 liability company

15 Defendant.

Case No.

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

16 **CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT**

17 Plaintiff Diana Saiki, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings  
18 this action against Defendant MCG Health, LLC (“MCG Health” or “Defendant”), a Washington  
19 limited liability company, to obtain damages, restitution and injunctive relief for the Class, as  
20 defined below, from Defendant. Plaintiff makes the following allegations upon information and  
21 belief, except as to her own actions, the investigation of counsel, and the facts that are a matter of  
22 public record.  
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**NATURE OF THE ACTION**

1  
2 1. Defendant is a HIPAA business associate that provides patient care guidelines to  
3 health care providers and health plans.

4 2. As a condition of its services, Defendant requires patients and/or patient  
5 healthcare networks to provide sensitive and private information, including, but not limited to,  
6 patient names, gender, telephone numbers, addresses, dates of birth, Social Security numbers,  
7 and medical and code information.  
8

9 3. On March 25, 2022, Defendant discovered an unauthorized party previously  
10 obtained certain personal information of its customers' patients and members that matched data  
11 stored on Defendant's systems (the "Data Breach"). The affected patient and/or member data  
12 included some or all of the following data elements: names, Social Security numbers, medical  
13 codes, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth and gender.  
14

15 4. Upon learning of the issue, Defendant investigated the Data Breach and  
16 discovered that an unauthorized party may have acquired the Private Information of Plaintiff and  
17 approximately 1,100,000 Class Members on or around February 25, 2022 and February 26, 2022

18 5. Despite discovering the Data Breach on March 10, 2022, Defendant did not notify  
19 Plaintiff and Class Members until June 10, 2022 ("Notice of Data Breach").  
20

21 6. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and over a million Class Members  
22 suffered injury and ascertainable losses in the form of the present and imminent threat of fraud  
23 and identity theft, loss of the benefit of their bargain, out-of-pocket expenses, loss of value of  
24 their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the attack, and the loss of, and  
25 diminution in, value of their personal information.  
26

1           7.       In addition, Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ sensitive confidential Information—  
2 which was entrusted to Defendant—was compromised and unlawfully accessed due to the Data  
3 Breach. This information, while compromised and taken by unauthorized third parties, remains  
4 also in the possession of Defendant, and without additional safeguards and independent review  
5 and oversight, remains vulnerable to additional hackers and theft.  
6

7           8.       Information compromised in the Data Breach includes names, Social Security  
8 numbers, medical codes, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth and  
9 gender, and potentially other protected health information as defined by the Health Insurance  
10 Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) that Defendant collected and maintained  
11 (collectively referred the “Private Information”).<sup>1</sup>  
12

13           9.       Defendant did not notify patients that their Private Information was subject to  
14 unauthorized access resulting from the Data Breach until June 10, 2022, nearly two-and-a-half  
15 months after the attack was launched and the Data Breach was discovered.

16           10.      The Data Breach was a direct result of Defendant’s failure to implement adequate  
17 and reasonable cyber-security procedures and protocols necessary to protect patients’ and  
18 employees’ Private Information.  
19

20           11.      Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit on behalf of those similarly situated to  
21 address Defendant’s inadequate safeguarding of Class Members’ Private Information that  
22 Defendant collected and maintained, and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to  
23

24  
25 <sup>1</sup> The term “Private Information” includes separately and jointly the terms “Personally  
26 Identifiable Information” (“PII”) and “Protected Health Information” (“PHI”). Specifically,  
Plaintiff alleges the information disclosed in the Data Breach constitutes both PII (*e.g.*, name,  
address, and SSN) and PHI (*e.g.*, name, SSN, gender, medical code).

1 Plaintiff and other Class Members that their information had been subject to the unauthorized  
2 access by an unknown third party.

3 12. Defendant maintained the Private Information in a reckless manner. In particular,  
4 the Private Information was maintained on Defendant's computer network in a condition  
5 vulnerable to cyberattacks.  
6

7 13. The mechanism of the hacking and potential for improper disclosure of Plaintiff's  
8 and Class Members' Private Information was a known risk to Defendant and entities like it, and  
9 thus Defendant was on notice that failing to take steps necessary to secure the Private  
10 Information from those risks left that property in a dangerous condition and vulnerable to theft.

11 14. Defendant disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members (defined below)  
12 by, inter alia, intentionally, willfully, recklessly, or negligently failing to take adequate and  
13 reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected against unauthorized intrusions;  
14 failing to disclose that it did not have adequately robust computer systems and security practices  
15 to safeguard patient Private Information; failing to take standard and reasonably available steps  
16 to prevent the Data Breach; failing to properly train its staff and employees on proper security  
17 measures; and failing to provide Plaintiff and Class Members prompt notice of the Data Breach.  
18

19 15. In addition, Defendant and its employees failed to properly monitor the computer  
20 network and systems that housed the Private Information. Had Defendant properly monitored its  
21 property, it would have discovered the intrusion sooner, as opposed to letting cyberthieves roam  
22 freely in Defendant's IT network for nearly two full weeks.  
23  
24  
25  
26

1           16. Plaintiff's and Class Members' identities are now at risk because of Defendant's  
2 negligent conduct since the Private Information that Defendant collected and maintained is now  
3 in the hands of data thieves. This present risk will continue for their respective lifetimes.

4           17. Armed with the Private Information accessed in the Data Breach, data thieves can  
5 commit a variety of crimes including, e.g., opening new financial accounts in Class Members'  
6 names, taking out loans in Class Members' names, using Class Members' names to obtain  
7 medical services, using Class Members' information to obtain government benefits, filing  
8 fraudulent tax returns using Class Members' information, obtaining driver's licenses in Class  
9 Members' names but with another person's photograph, and giving false information to police  
10 during an arrest.  
11

12           18. As a result of the Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class Members have been exposed to  
13 a present and imminent risk of fraud and identity theft. Plaintiff and Class Members must now  
14 and in the future closely monitor their financial accounts to guard against identity theft.  
15

16           19. Plaintiff and Class Members will incur out of pocket costs for, e.g., purchasing  
17 credit monitoring services, credit freezes, credit reports, or other protective measures to deter and  
18 detect identity theft.

19           20. Plaintiff seeks to remedy these harms on behalf of herself and all similarly  
20 situated individuals whose Private Information was accessed during the Data Breach.  
21

22           21. Plaintiff seeks remedies including, but not limited to, compensatory damages,  
23 nominal damages, and reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs.

24           22. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive and equitable relief to prevent future injury on  
25 behalf of herself and the putative Class.  
26

**PARTIES**

23. Plaintiff Diana Saiki is, and at all times mentioned herein was, an individual citizen of the State of Indiana residing in the City of Muncie. Plaintiff Diana Saiki was a patient at an Indiana University Health Center which was an affiliate of Defendant. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff provided Private Information to Indiana University Health Center, which then provided Plaintiff's Private Information to Defendant. Plaintiff was notified of Defendant's Data Breach and her Private Information being compromised upon receiving a notice letter dated June 10, 2022.

24. Defendant is a HIPAA business associate that provides patient care guidelines to health care providers and health plans with its principal place of business at 901 Fifth Avenue, Suite 120, Seattle, WA 98164.

**JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

25. The Western District of Washington has personal jurisdiction over Defendant named in this action because Defendant and/or its parents or affiliates are headquartered in this District and Defendant conducts substantial business in Washington and this District through its headquarters, offices, parents, and affiliates.

26. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant and/or its parents or affiliates are headquartered in this District and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District.

**DEFENDANT'S BUSINESS**

1           27. Defendant is a HIPAA business associate that provides patient care guidelines to  
2 health care providers and health plans with its principal place of business in Seattle, Washington.  
3 Defendant provides services on a nationwide basis.

4           28. Defendant requires Plaintiff and Class Members or the healthcare networks that  
5 Plaintiff and Class Members use to provide the following Private Information:  
6 names, Social Security numbers, medical codes, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email  
7 addresses, dates of birth and gender.  
8

- 9                   • Name;
- 10                  • Social Security Number;
- 11                  • Medical Code;
- 12                  • Postal Address;
- 13                  • Telephone Number;
- 14                  • Email Address;
- 15                  • Date of Birth; and
- 16                  • Gender
- 17

18           29. Prior to receiving Defendant's services, Plaintiff and Class Members and/or their  
19 healthcare providers were required to and did in fact turn over much (if not all) of the private and  
20 confidential information listed above.  
21

22           30. On information and belief, Defendant provides each of its patients with a HIPAA  
23 compliant notice of its privacy practices (the "Privacy Notice") in respect to how they handle  
24 Private Information.  
25  
26

1           31. A copy of the Privacy Notice is maintained on Defendant's website, and may be  
2 found here: <https://www.mcg.com/privacy-policy/>.

3           32. Due to the highly sensitive and personal nature of the information Defendant  
4 acquires and stores with respect to its patients, Defendant recognizes privacy rights, and  
5 promises in its Privacy Notice, to, among other things, maintain the privacy of patients'  
6 protected health information, which includes the types of data compromised in this Data Breach.

7           33. Defendant promises to maintain the confidentiality of Plaintiff's and Class  
8 Members' Private Information to ensure compliance with federal and state laws and regulations,  
9 and not to use or disclose Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information for any reasons  
10 other than those expressly listed in the Privacy Notice without written authorization.

11           34. As a condition of receiving Defendant's services, Defendant requires that Plaintiff  
12 and Class Members entrust it with highly sensitive personal information.

13           35. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from Plaintiff's and Class  
14 Members' Private Information, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or  
15 should have known that it was responsible for protecting Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private  
16 Information from unauthorized disclosure.

17           36. Plaintiff and the Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the  
18 confidentiality of their Private Information. Plaintiff and Class Members would not have  
19 entrusted Defendant with their Private Information had they known that Defendant would fail to  
20 implement industry standard protections for that sensitive information.



37. Plaintiff and the Class Members relied on Defendant to keep their Private Information confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for business and health purposes only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this information.

### **THE ATTACK AND DATA BREACH**

38. On March 25, 2022, Defendant identified suspicious activity in its employee email network and determined that between February 25, 2022 and February 26, 2022 an unauthorized party had access to Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information stored on Defendant's systems.

39. Defendant acknowledges that "an unauthorized party previously obtained certain of your personal information that matched data stored on [Defendant's] systems. The affected patient or member data included some or all of the following data elements: names, Social Security numbers, medical codes, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of birth, and gender."<sup>2</sup>

40. On information and belief, the cybercriminals did in fact access Defendant's files, and exfiltrate Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information during the roughly two weeks in which the cybercriminals had unfettered access to Defendant's email network.

41. On information and belief, the Private Information contained in the emails accessed by hackers was not encrypted.

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<sup>2</sup> [https://www.mcg.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/MCG-Website-Notice\\_90273447\\_1-6.8.22481312.4-004.pdf](https://www.mcg.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/MCG-Website-Notice_90273447_1-6.8.22481312.4-004.pdf).

1           42.     On information and belief, the cyber-attack was targeted at Defendant due to its  
2 status as a HIPAA associated business entity that collects, creates, and maintains Private  
3 Information.

4           43.     On information and belief, the targeted attack was expressly designed to gain  
5 access to and exfiltrate private and confidential data, including (among other things) the Private  
6 Information of patients and/or members, like Plaintiff and the Class Members.  
7

8           44.     While Defendant stated in notice letters sent to Plaintiff and Class Members (as  
9 well as on its website) that it learned of the Data Breach in March 2022, Defendant did not begin  
10 notifying impacted patients, such as Plaintiff and Class Members, until June 10, 2022– nearly  
11 two and a half months after discovering the Data Breach.  
12

13           45.     Due to Defendant’s inadequate security measures, Plaintiff and the Class  
14 Members now face a present, immediate, and ongoing risk of fraud and identity theft and must  
15 deal with that threat forever.

16           46.     Defendant had obligations created by HIPAA, contract, industry standards,  
17 common law, and its own promises and representations made to Plaintiff and Class Members to  
18 keep their Private Information confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access and  
19 disclosure.  
20

21           47.     Plaintiff and Class Members provided their Private Information to Defendant with  
22 the reasonable expectation and mutual understanding that Defendant would comply with its  
23 obligations to keep such information confidential and secure from unauthorized access.

24                   **THE DATA BREACH WAS FORSEEABLE**  
25  
26

1           48. Defendant's data security obligations were particularly important given the  
2 substantial increase in cyberattacks and/or data breaches in the healthcare industry preceding the  
3 date of the breach.

4           49. In 2019, a record 1,473 data breaches occurred, resulting in approximately  
5 164,683,455 sensitive records being exposed, a 17% increase from 2018.<sup>3</sup> Of the 1,473 recorded  
6 data breaches, 525 of them, or 35.64%, were in the medical or healthcare industry.<sup>4</sup> The 525  
7 reported breaches reported in 2019 exposed nearly 40 million sensitive records (39,378,157),  
8 compared to only 369 breaches that exposed just over 10 million sensitive records (10,632,600)  
9 in 2018.<sup>5</sup> These incidents continue to rise in frequency, with an estimated 1,862 data breaches  
10 occurring in 2021.<sup>6</sup>

11           50. In light of recent high profile cybersecurity incidents at other healthcare partner  
12 and provider companies, including, American Medical Collection Agency (25 million patients,  
13 March 2019) University of Washington Medicine (974,000 patients, December 2018), Florida  
14 Orthopedic Institute (640,000 patients, July 2020), Wolverine Solutions Group (600,000 patients,  
15 September 2018), Oregon Department of Human Services (645,000 patients, March 2019), Elite  
16 Emergency Physicians (550,000 patients, June 2020), Magellan Health (365,000 patients, April  
17 2020), BJC Health System (286,876 patients, March 2020), Defendant knew or should have  
18 known that its electronic records would be targeted by cybercriminals.  
19  
20  
21  
22

23 <sup>3</sup> [https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/01.28.2020\\_ITRC\\_2019-End-of-](https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/01.28.2020_ITRC_2019-End-of-Year-Data-Breach-Report_FINAL_Highres-Appendix.pdf)  
24 [Year-Data-Breach-Report\\_FINAL\\_Highres-Appendix.pdf](https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/01.28.2020_ITRC_2019-End-of-Year-Data-Breach-Report_FINAL_Highres-Appendix.pdf) (last accessed June 1, 2021)

25 <sup>4</sup> *Id.*

26 <sup>5</sup> *Id.* at p15.

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/record-number-of-data-breaches-reported-in-2021-new-report-says/>

1           51. In 2021 alone, there were over 220 data breach incidents.<sup>7</sup> These approximately  
2 220 data breach incidents have impacted nearly 15 million individuals.<sup>8</sup>

3           52. Indeed, cyberattacks have become so notorious that the Federal Bureau of  
4 Investigation (“FBI”) and U.S. Secret Service have issued a warning to potential targets so they  
5 are aware of, and prepared for, a potential attack. As one report explained, “[e]ntities like smaller  
6 municipalities and hospitals are attractive to ransomware criminals... because they often have  
7 lesser IT defenses and a high incentive to regain access to their data quickly.”<sup>9</sup>

8           53. In fact, according to the cybersecurity firm Mimecast, 90% of healthcare  
9 organizations experienced cyberattacks in the past year.<sup>10</sup>

10           54. Therefore, the increase in such attacks, and the attendant risk of future attacks,  
11 was widely known to the public and to anyone in Defendant’s industry, including Defendant.  
12

13           55. As a sophisticated healthcare entity that collects and stores a particularly sensitive  
14 PII, an email phishing attack, and the potential harms arising therefrom, was reasonably  
15 foreseeable to Defendant.  
16

17           **DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY PROTECT PLAINTIFF’S AND CLASS**  
18           **MEMBERS’ PRIVATE INFORMATION**

19  
20  
21           <sup>7</sup> See Kim Delmonico, Another (!) Orthopedic Practice Reports Data Breach, Orthopedics This  
22 Week (May 24, 2021), <https://ryortho.com/breaking/another-orthopedic-practice-reports-data-breach/>.

23           <sup>8</sup> *Id.*

24           <sup>9</sup> *FBI, Secret Service Warn of Targeted*, Law360 (Nov. 18, 2019),  
<https://www.law360.com/articles/1220974/fbi-secret-service-warn-of-targeted-ransomware> (last  
25 visited July 2, 2021).

26           <sup>10</sup> See Maria Henriquez, Iowa City Hospital Suffers Phishing Attack, Security Magazine (Nov.  
23, 2020), <https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/93988-iowa-city-hospital-suffers-phishing-attack>.

56. Defendant did not use reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the sensitive, unencrypted Private Information it was maintaining for Plaintiff and Class Members, causing the exposure of Private Information for more than 1,100,000 individuals.

***Defendant failed to properly comply with Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) data security standards***

57. The FTC promulgated numerous guides for businesses which highlight the importance of implementing reasonable data security practices. According to the FTC, the need for data security should be factored into all business decision-making.

58. In 2016, the FTC updated its publication, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, which established cyber-security guidelines for businesses. The guidelines note that businesses should protect the personal patient information that they keep; properly dispose of personal information that is no longer needed; encrypt information stored on computer networks; understand their network’s vulnerabilities; and implement policies to correct any security problems.<sup>11</sup> The guidelines also recommend that businesses use an intrusion detection system to expose a breach as soon as it occurs; monitor all incoming traffic for activity indicating someone is attempting to hack the system; watch for large amounts of data being transmitted from the system; and have a response plan ready in the event of a breach.<sup>12</sup>

59. The FTC further recommends that companies not maintain PII longer than is needed for authorization of a transaction; limit access to sensitive data; require complex

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<sup>11</sup> *Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business*, Federal Trade Commission (2016). Available at [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136\\_proteting-personal-information.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf) (last visited June 15, 2021).

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

1 passwords to be used on networks; use industry-tested methods for security; monitor for  
2 suspicious activity on the network; and verify that third-party service providers have  
3 implemented reasonable security measures.

4         60. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against businesses for failing to  
5 adequately and reasonably protect patient data, treating the failure to employ reasonable and  
6 appropriate measures to protect against unauthorized access to confidential consumer data as an  
7 unfair act or practice prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”),  
8 15 U.S.C. § 45. Orders resulting from these actions further clarify the measures businesses must  
9 take to meet their data security obligations.  
10

11         61. These FTC enforcement actions include actions against healthcare providers like  
12 Defendant. See, e.g., *In the Matter of Labmd, Inc.*, A Corp, 2016-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 79708,  
13 2016 WL 4128215, at \*32 (MSNET July 28, 2016) (“[T]he Commission concludes that  
14 LabMD’s data security practices were unreasonable and constitute an unfair act or practice in  
15 violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.”)  
16

17         62. Defendant failed to properly implement basic data security practices explained  
18 and set forth by the FTC.

19         63. Defendant’s failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect  
20 against unauthorized access to patients’ Private Information constitutes an unfair act or practice  
21 prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.  
22

23         64. Defendant was at all times fully aware of its obligation to protect the Private  
24 Information of its patients. Defendant was also aware of the significant repercussions that would  
25 result from its failure to do so.  
26

***Defendant failed to comply with industry standards***

65. Defendant did not utilize industry standards appropriate to the nature of the sensitive, unencrypted information they were maintaining for Plaintiff and Class Members, causing the exposure of Private Information for more than 1,100,000 individuals.

66. As explained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “[p]revention is the most effective defense against cyberattacks] and it is critical to take precautions for protection.”<sup>13</sup>

67. To prevent and detect cyberattacks, including the cyberattack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Government, the following measures:

- Implement an awareness and training program. Because end users are targets, employees and individuals should be aware of the threat of cyberattack.
- Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
- Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files from reaching end users.
- Configure firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
- Patch operating systems, software, and firmware on devices. Consider using a centralized patch management system.
- Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans automatically.
- Manage the use of privileged accounts based on the principle of least privilege: no users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed; and

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<sup>13</sup> See How to Protect Your Networks from RANSOMWARE, at 3, *available at* <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ransomware-prevention-and-response-for-cisos.pdf/view> (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).

those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary.

- Configure access controls—including file, directory, and network share permissions—with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files, the user should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares.
- Disable macro scripts from office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full office suite applications.
- Implement Software Restriction Policies (SRP) or other controls to prevent programs from executing from common malware locations, such as temporary folders supporting popular Internet browsers or compression/decompression programs, including the AppData/LocalAppData folder.
- Consider disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
- Use application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs known and permitted by security policy.
- Execute operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized environment.
- Categorize data based on organizational value and implement physical and logical separation of networks and data for different organizational units.<sup>14</sup>

68. To prevent and detect ransomware attacks, including the ransomware attack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, the following measures:

- **Update and patch your computer.** Ensure your applications and operating systems (OSs) have been updated with the latest patches. Vulnerable applications and OSs are the target of most ransomware attacks....
- **Use caution with links and when entering website addresses.** Be careful when clicking directly on links in emails, even if the sender appears to be someone you know. Attempt to independently verify website addresses (e.g., contact your

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<sup>14</sup> *Id.* at 3-4.



organization's helpdesk, search the internet for the sender organization's website or the topic mentioned in the email). Pay attention to the website addresses you click on, as well as those you enter yourself. Malicious website addresses often appear almost identical to legitimate sites, often using a slight variation in spelling or a different domain (e.g., .com instead of .net)....

- **Open email attachments with caution.** Be wary of opening email attachments, even from senders you think you know, particularly when attachments are compressed files or ZIP files.
- **Keep your personal information safe.** Check a website's security to ensure the information you submit is encrypted before you provide it....
- **Verify email senders.** If you are unsure whether or not an email is legitimate, try to verify the email's legitimacy by contacting the sender directly. Do not click on any links in the email. If possible, use a previous (legitimate) email to ensure the contact information you have for the sender is authentic before you contact them.
- **Inform yourself.** Keep yourself informed about recent cybersecurity threats and up to date on ransomware techniques. You can find information about known phishing attacks on the Anti-Phishing Working Group website. You may also want to sign up for CISA product notifications, which will alert you when a new Alert, Analysis Report, Bulletin, Current Activity, or Tip has been published.
- **Use and maintain preventative software programs.** Install antivirus software, firewalls, and email filters—and keep them updated—to reduce malicious network traffic....<sup>15</sup>

69. To prevent and detect cyberattacks, including the cyberattack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team, the following measures:

**Secure internet-facing assets**

- Apply latest security updates
- Use threat and vulnerability management
- Perform regular audit; remove privileged credentials;

<sup>15</sup> See Security Tip (ST19-001) Protecting Against Ransomware (original release date Apr. 11, 2019), available at <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST19-001> (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).

**Thoroughly investigate and remediate alerts**

- Prioritize and treat commodity malware infections as potential full compromise;

**Include IT Pros in security discussions**

- Ensure collaboration among [security operations], [security admins], and [information technology] admins to configure servers and other endpoints securely;

**Build credential hygiene**

- Use [multifactor authentication] or [network level authentication] and use strong, randomized, just-in-time local admin passwords

**Apply principle of least-privilege**

- Monitor for adversarial activities
- Hunt for brute force attempts
- Monitor for cleanup of Event Logs
- Analyze logon events

**Harden infrastructure**

- Use Windows Defender Firewall
- Enable tamper protection
- Enable cloud-delivered protection
- Turn on attack surface reduction rules and [Antimalware Scan Interface] for Office [Visual Basic for Applications].<sup>16</sup>

70. As described above, experts studying cyber security routinely identify healthcare providers as being particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks because of the value of the PII and PHI which they collect and maintain.

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<sup>16</sup> See Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster (Mar 5, 2020), *available at* <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/> (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).

1           71. Several best practices have been identified that at a minimum should be  
2 implemented by healthcare providers like Defendant, including but not limited to: educating all  
3 employees; strong passwords; multi-layer security, including firewalls, anti-virus, and anti-  
4 malware software; encryption, making data unreadable without a key; multi-factor  
5 authentication; backup data, and; limiting which employees can access sensitive data.  
6

7           72. Other best cybersecurity practices that are standard in the healthcare industry  
8 include installing appropriate malware detection software; monitoring and limiting the network  
9 ports; protecting web browsers and email management systems; setting up network systems such  
10 as firewalls, switches and routers; monitoring and protection of physical security systems;  
11 protection against any possible communication system; training staff regarding critical points.  
12

13           73. Defendant failed to meet the minimum standards of any of the following  
14 frameworks: the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 (including without limitation  
15 PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.AT-1, PR.DS-1, PR.DS-5,  
16 PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-4, DE.CM-7, DE.CM-8, and RS.CO-2), and the Center  
17 for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS CSC), which are all established standards  
18 in reasonable cybersecurity readiness.  
19

20           74. These foregoing frameworks are existing and applicable industry standards in the  
21 healthcare industry, and Defendant failed to comply with these accepted standards, thereby  
22 opening the door to and causing the Data Breach.

23           75. Defendant's Conduct Violates HIPAA and Evidences Its Insufficient Data  
24 Security  
25  
26

1           76.     HIPAA requires covered entities such as Defendant to protect against reasonably  
 2 anticipated threats to the security of sensitive patient health information. And phishing is  
 3 undoubtedly a well-known and common attack vector about which Defendant should have been  
 4 aware and prepared to repel.

5           77.     Covered entities must implement safeguards to ensure the confidentiality,  
 6 integrity, and availability of PHI. Those safeguards must include physical, technical, educational,  
 7 and administrative components.

8           78.     Title II of HIPAA contains what are known as the Administrative Simplification  
 9 provisions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301, et seq. These provisions require, among other things, that the  
 10 Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) create rules to streamline the standards for  
 11 handling PII like the data Defendant left unguarded. The HHS subsequently promulgated  
 12 multiple regulations under authority of the Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA.  
 13 These rules include 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1-4); 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1); 45 C.F.R. §  
 14 164.308(a)(1)(i); 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), and 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b).

15           79.     Given that Defendant was storing the Private Information of more than 1,100,000  
 16 individuals—and likely much more than that—Defendant could and should have implemented  
 17 all of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks.

18           80.     The occurrence of the Data Breach indicates that Defendant failed to adequately  
 19 implement one or more of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks, resulting in the Data  
 20 Breach and the exposure of approximately 1,100,000 individuals’ Private Information.

## 21                               **DEFENDANT’S BREACH**

22                               ***Defendant failed to properly protect Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information***

1           81. Defendant breached its obligations to Plaintiff and Class Members and was  
2 otherwise negligent and reckless because it failed to properly maintain and safeguard its  
3 computer systems and data. Defendant's unlawful conduct includes, but is not limited to, the  
4 following acts and/or omissions:

- 5           a. Failing to maintain an adequate data security system to reduce the risk of data  
6 breaches, cyber-attacks, hacking incidents, and ransomware attacks;
- 7           b. Failing to adequately protect patients' Private Information;
- 8           c. Failing to properly monitor its own data security systems for existing or prior  
9 intrusions;
- 10           d. Failing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of electronic PHI it created,  
11 received, maintained, and/or transmitted, in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1);
- 12           e. Failing to implement technical policies and procedures for electronic information  
13 systems that maintain electronic PHI to allow access only to those persons or  
14 software programs that have been granted access rights in violation of 45 C.F.R. §  
15 164.312(a)(1);
- 16           f. Failing to implement policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct  
17 security violations in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(i);
- 18           g. Failing to implement procedures to review records of information system activity  
19 regularly, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking reports  
20 in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D);
- 21           h. Failing to protect against reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security  
22 or integrity of electronic PHI in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2);
- 23
- 24
- 25
- 26

- i. Failing to protect against reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of electronic PHI that are not permitted under the privacy rules regarding individually identifiable health information in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(3);
- j. Failing to ensure compliance with HIPAA security standard rules by its workforces in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(4);
- k. Failing to train all members of its workforces effectively on the policies and procedures regarding PHI as necessary and appropriate for the members of its workforces to carry out their functions and to maintain security of PHI, in violation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(b);
- l. Failing to render the electronic PHI it maintained unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals, as it had not encrypted the electronic PHI as specified in the HIPAA Security Rule by “the use of an algorithmic process to transform data into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key” (45 CFR § 164.304’s definition of “encryption”);
- m. Failing to comply with FTC guidelines for cybersecurity, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, and;
- n. Failing to adhere to industry standards for cybersecurity.

82. As the result of computer systems in need of security upgrades, inadequate procedures for handling email phishing attacks, viruses, malignant computer code, hacking attacks, Defendant negligently and unlawfully failed to safeguard Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ Private Information.

83. Accordingly, as outlined below, Plaintiff and Class Members now face a present, increased, and immediate risk of fraud and identity theft. In addition, Plaintiff and the Class Members also lost the benefit of the bargain they made with Defendant because of its inadequate data security practices for which they gave good and valuable consideration.

***Cyberattacks and data breaches cause disruption and put individuals at an increased risk of fraud and identity theft***

84. Hacking incidents and data breaches at healthcare related companies like Defendant are especially problematic because of the sensitive nature of the information at issue and the disruption they cause to the medical treatment and overall daily lives of patients affected by the attack.

85. Researchers have found that at medical facilities that experienced a data security incident, the death rate among patients increased in the months and years after the attack.<sup>17</sup>

86. Researchers have further found that at medical facilities that experienced a data security incident, the incident was associated with deterioration in timeliness and patient outcomes, generally.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> See Nsikan Akpan, *Ransomware and Data Breaches Linked to Uptick in Fatal Heart Attacks*, PBS (Oct. 24, 2019), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/ransomware-and-other-data-breaches-linked-to-uptick-in-fatal-heart-attacks>.

<sup>18</sup> See Sung J. Choi et al., *Data Breach Remediation Efforts and Their Implications for Hospital Quality*, 54 Health Services Research 971, 971-980 (2019). Available at <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1475-6773.13203>.

1           87.     The United States Government Accountability Office released a report in 2007  
2 regarding data breaches (“GAO Report”) in which it noted that victims of identity theft will face  
3 “substantial costs and time to repair the damage to their good name and credit record.”<sup>19</sup>

4           88.     That is because any victim of a data breach is exposed to serious ramifications  
5 regardless of the nature of the data. Indeed, the reason criminals steal personally identifiable  
6 information is to monetize it. They do this by selling the spoils of their cyberattacks on the black  
7 market to identity thieves who desire to extort and harass victims, take over victims’ identities in  
8 order to engage in illegal financial transactions under the victims’ names. Because a person’s  
9 identity is akin to a puzzle, the more accurate pieces of data an identity thief obtains about a  
10 person, the easier it is for the thief to take on the victim’s identity, or otherwise harass or track  
11 the victim. For example, armed with just a name and date of birth, a data thief can utilize a  
12 hacking technique referred to as “social engineering” to obtain even more information about a  
13 victim’s identity, such as a person’s login credentials or Social Security number. Social  
14 engineering is a form of hacking whereby a data thief uses previously acquired information to  
15 manipulate individuals into disclosing additional confidential or personal information through  
16 means such as spam phone calls and text messages or phishing emails.

17           89.     The FTC recommends that identity theft victims take several steps to protect their  
18 personal and financial information after a data breach, including contacting one of the credit  
19 bureaus to place a fraud alert (consider an extended fraud alert that lasts for 7 years if someone  
20 steals their identity), reviewing their credit reports, contacting companies to remove fraudulent  
21

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25 <sup>19</sup> See U.S. Gov. Accounting Office, GAO-07-737, Personal Information: Data Breaches Are  
26 Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is  
Unknown (2007). Available at <https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf>.



1 charges from their accounts, placing a credit freeze on their credit, and correcting their credit  
2 reports.<sup>20</sup>

3 90. Identity thieves use stolen personal information such as Social Security numbers  
4 for a variety of crimes, including credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank/finance  
5 fraud.  
6

7 91. Identity thieves can also use Social Security numbers to obtain a driver's license  
8 or official identification card in the victim's name but with the thief's picture; use the victim's  
9 name and Social Security number to obtain government benefits; or file a fraudulent tax return  
10 using the victim's information. In addition, identity thieves may obtain a job using the victim's  
11 Social Security number, rent a house or receive medical services in the victim's name, and may  
12 even give the victim's personal information to police during an arrest resulting in an arrest  
13 warrant being issued in the victim's name.  
14


15 92. A study by Identity Theft Resource Center shows the multitude of harms caused  
16 by fraudulent use of personal and financial information:<sup>21</sup>  
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23

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24 <sup>20</sup> See *IdentityTheft.gov*, Federal Trade Commission, <https://www.identitytheft.gov/Steps> (last  
visited Mar. 16, 2021).

25 <sup>21</sup> See Jason Steele, *Credit Card and ID Theft Statistics*, CreditCards.com (Oct. 23, 2020)  
26 [https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-security-id-theft-fraud-statistics-  
1276.php](https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-security-id-theft-fraud-statistics-1276.php).

## Americans' expenses/disruptions as a result of criminal activity in their name [2016]



Source: Identity Theft Resource Center

creditcards.com

93. Moreover, theft of Private Information is also gravely serious. PII and PHI are extremely valuable property rights.<sup>22</sup>

94. Its value is axiomatic, considering the value of “big data” in corporate America and the fact that the consequences of cyber thefts include heavy prison sentences. Even this obvious risk to reward analysis illustrates beyond doubt that Private Information has considerable market value.

95. Theft of PHI, in particular, is gravely serious: “[a] thief may use your name or health insurance numbers to see a doctor, get prescription drugs, file claims with your insurance

<sup>22</sup> See, e.g., John T. Soma, et al, Corporate Privacy Trend: The “Value” of Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) Equals the “Value” of Financial Assets, 15 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 11, at \*3-4 (2009) (“PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial assets.”) (citations omitted).

1 provider, or get other care. If the thief's health information is mixed with yours, your treatment,  
 2 insurance and payment records, and credit report may be affected."<sup>23</sup>

3 96. Drug manufacturers, medical device manufacturers, pharmacies, hospitals and  
 4 other healthcare service providers often purchase PII and PHI on the black market for the  
 5 purpose of target marketing their products and services to the physical maladies of the data  
 6 breach victims themselves. Insurance companies purchase and use wrongfully disclosed PHI to  
 7 adjust their insureds' medical insurance premiums.  
 8

9 97. It must also be noted there may be a substantial time lag – measured in years --  
 10 between when harm occurs and when it is discovered, and also between when Private  
 11 Information and/or financial information is stolen and when it is used.  
 12

13 98. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which conducted a  
 14 study regarding data breaches:

15 [L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data  
 16 may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit  
 17 identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on  
 18 the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for  
 19 years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm  
 20 resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future  
 21 harm.

22 See GAO Report, at p. 29.

23 99. Private Information is such a valuable commodity to identity thieves that once the  
 24 information has been compromised, criminals often trade the information on the "cyber black-  
 25 market" for years.  
 26

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<sup>23</sup> See Federal Trade Commission, *Medical Identity Theft*,  
<http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0171-medical-identity-theft> (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).

1           100. There is a strong probability that entire batches of stolen information have been  
2           dumped on the black market and are yet to be dumped on the black market, meaning Plaintiff  
3           and Class Members are at an increased risk of fraud and identity theft for many years into the  
4           future.

5           101. Thus, Plaintiff and Class Members must vigilantly monitor their financial and  
6           medical accounts for many years to come.

7           102. Sensitive Private Information can sell for as much as \$363 per record according to  
8           the Infosec Institute.<sup>24</sup> PII is particularly valuable because criminals can use it to target victims  
9           with frauds and scams. Once PII is stolen, fraudulent use of that information and damage to  
10          victims may continue for years.

11          103. For example, the Social Security Administration has warned that identity thieves  
12          can use an individual's Social Security number to apply for additional credit lines.<sup>25</sup> Such fraud  
13          may go undetected until debt collection calls commence months, or even years, later. Stolen  
14          Social Security Numbers also make it possible for thieves to file fraudulent tax returns, file for  
15          unemployment benefits, or apply for a job using a false identity.<sup>26</sup> Each of these fraudulent  
16          activities is difficult to detect. An individual may not know that his or her Social Security  
17          Number was used to file for unemployment benefits until law enforcement notifies the  
18          individual's employer of the suspected fraud. Fraudulent tax returns are typically discovered  
19          only when an individual's authentic tax return is rejected.

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20          <sup>24</sup> See Ashiq Ja, *Hackers Selling Healthcare Data in the Black Market*, InfoSec (July 27, 2015),  
21          <https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/hackers-selling-healthcare-data-in-the-black-market/>.

22          <sup>25</sup> *Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number*, Social Security Administration (2018) at 1.  
23          Available at <https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10064.pdf> (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).

24          <sup>26</sup> *Id* at 4.

1           104. Moreover, it is not an easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security  
2 number.

3           105. An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant  
4 paperwork and evidence of actual misuse. Even then, a new Social Security number may not be  
5 effective, as “[t]he credit bureaus and banks are able to link the new number very quickly to the  
6 old number, so all of that old bad information is quickly inherited into the new Social Security  
7 number.”<sup>27</sup>

8           106. This data, as one would expect, demands a much higher price on the black  
9 market. Martin Walter, senior director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, “[c]ompared to  
10 credit card information, personally identifiable information and Social Security Numbers are  
11 worth more than 10x on the black market.”<sup>28</sup>

12           107. Medical information is especially valuable to identity thieves.

13           108. According to account monitoring company LogDog, coveted Social Security  
14 numbers were selling on the dark web for just \$1 in 2016 – the same as a Facebook account.<sup>29</sup>  
15 That pales in comparison with the asking price for medical data, which was selling for \$50 and  
16 up.<sup>30</sup>

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21           <sup>27</sup> Brian Naylor, *Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find It's Hard to Bounce Back*, NPR  
(Feb. 9, 2015), [http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-](http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millions-worrying-about-identity-theft)  
22           [millions-worrying-about-identity-theft](http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millions-worrying-about-identity-theft).

23           <sup>28</sup> Tim Greene, *Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card*  
24           *Numbers*, Computer World (Feb. 6, 2015), [http://www.itworld.com/article/2880960/anthem-](http://www.itworld.com/article/2880960/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html)  
25           [hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html](http://www.itworld.com/article/2880960/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html).

26           <sup>29</sup> See Omri Toppol, *Email Security: How You Are Doing It Wrong & Paying Too Much*,  
LogDog (Feb. 14, 2016), <https://getlogdog.com/blogdog/email-security-you-are-doing-it-wrong/>.

<sup>30</sup> Lisa Vaas, *Ransomware Attacks Paralyze, and Sometimes Crush, Hospitals*, Naked Security  
(Oct. 3, 2019), [https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/10/03/ransomware-attacks-paralyze-and-](https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/10/03/ransomware-attacks-paralyze-and-sometimes-crush-hospitals/#content)  
[sometimes-crush-hospitals/#content](https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/10/03/ransomware-attacks-paralyze-and-sometimes-crush-hospitals/#content).

1           109. Because of the value of its collected and stored data, the medical industry has  
2 experienced disproportionately higher numbers of data theft events than other industries.

3           110. For this reason, Defendant knew or should have known about these dangers and  
4 strengthened its network and data security systems accordingly. Defendant was put on notice of  
5 the substantial and foreseeable risk of harm from a data breach, yet it failed to properly prepare  
6 for that risk.

7  
8                           ***Plaintiff's and Class Members' harms and damages***

9           111. To date, Defendant has done little to adequately protect Plaintiff and Class  
10 Members, or to compensate them for their injuries sustained in this data breach. Defendant's data  
11 breach notice letter completely downplays and disavows the theft of Plaintiff's and Class  
12 Members' Private Information, when the facts demonstrate that the Private Information was  
13 accessed and exfiltrated. The complimentary fraud and identity monitoring service offered by  
14 Defendant through Experian IdentityWorks is wholly inadequate as the services are only offered  
15 for 24 months and it places the burden squarely on Plaintiff's and Class Members by requiring  
16 them to expend time signing up for that service, as opposed to automatically enrolling all victims  
17 of this cybercrime.

18  
19           112. Plaintiff and Class Members have been injured and damaged by the compromise  
20 of their Private Information in the Data Breach.

21  
22           113. Plaintiff's Private Information (including without limitation her name, Social  
23 Security numbers, medical codes, postal addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, dates of  
24 birth, and gender) was compromised in the Data Breach and is now in the hands of the  
25  
26

1 cybercriminals who accessed Defendant's IT network. Class Members' Private Information, as  
2 described above, was similarly compromised and is now in the hands of the same cyberthieves.

3 114. Plaintiff typically takes measures to protect her Private Information and is very  
4 careful about sharing her Private Information. Plaintiff has never knowingly transmitted  
5 unencrypted Private Information over the internet or any other unsecured source.  
6

7 115. Plaintiff stores any documents containing her Private Information in a safe and  
8 secure location. Moreover, Plaintiff diligently chooses unique usernames and passwords for her  
9 online accounts.

10 116. To the best of her knowledge, Plaintiff's Private Information was never  
11 compromised in any other data breach.  
12

13 117. Plaintiff and Class Members face substantial risk of out-of-pocket fraud losses  
14 such as loans opened in their names, tax return fraud, utility bills opened in their names, and  
15 similar identity theft.

16 118. Plaintiff and Class Members face substantial risk of being targeted for future  
17 phishing, data intrusion, and other illegal schemes based on their Private Information as potential  
18 fraudsters could use that information to target such schemes more effectively to Plaintiff and  
19 Class Members.  
20

21 119. Plaintiff and Class Members will also incur out-of-pocket costs for protective  
22 measures such as credit monitoring fees (for any credit monitoring obtained in addition to or in  
23 lieu of the inadequate monitoring offered by Defendant), credit report fees, credit freeze fees,  
24 and similar costs directly or indirectly related to the Data Breach.  
25  
26

1           120. Plaintiff and Class Members also suffered a loss of value of their Private  
2 Information when it was acquired by the hacker and cyber thieves in the Data Breach. Numerous  
3 courts have recognized the propriety of loss of value damages in related cases.

4           121. Plaintiff and Class Members were also damaged via benefit-of-the-bargain  
5 damages. Plaintiff and Class Members overpaid for a service that was intended to be  
6 accompanied by adequate data security but was not. Part of the price Plaintiff and Class  
7 Members paid to Defendant was intended to be used by Defendant to fund adequate security of  
8 Defendant's computer property and protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.  
9 Thus, Plaintiff and the Class Members did not get what they paid for.

10           122. Plaintiff and Class Members have spent and will continue to spend significant  
11 amounts of time monitoring their financial and medical accounts and records for misuse. Indeed,  
12 Defendant's own notice of data breach provides instructions to Plaintiff and Class Members  
13 about all the time that they will need to spend monitor their own accounts and statements  
14 received from healthcare providers and health insurance plans.

15           123. Plaintiff spent many hours over the course of several days attempting to verify the  
16 veracity of the notice of breach that he received and to monitor her financial and online accounts  
17 for evidence of fraudulent activities.

18           124. Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered actual injury as a direct result of the  
19 Data Breach. Many victims suffered ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-pocket expenses  
20 and the value of their time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data  
21 Breach relating to:  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26



- a. Finding fraudulent loans, insurance claims, tax returns, and/or government benefit claims;
- b. Purchasing credit monitoring and identity theft prevention;
- c. Placing “freezes” and “alerts” with credit reporting agencies;
- d. Spending time on the phone with or at a financial institution or government agency to dispute fraudulent charges and/or claims;
- e. Contacting financial institutions and closing or modifying financial accounts;
- f. Closely reviewing and monitoring Social Security Number, medical insurance accounts, bank accounts, and credit reports for unauthorized activity for years to come.

125. Moreover, Plaintiff and Class Members have an interest in ensuring that their Private Information, which is believed to remain in the possession of Defendant, is protected from further breaches by the implementation of security measures and safeguards, including but not limited to, making sure that the storage of data or documents containing sensitive and confidential personal, health, and/or financial information is not accessible online, that access to such data is password-protected, and that such data is properly encrypted.

126. Further, as a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members are forced to live with the anxiety that their Private Information may be disclosed to the entire world, thereby subjecting them to embarrassment and depriving them of any right to privacy whatsoever.

127. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's actions and inactions, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered a loss of privacy and are at a present and imminent and increased risk of future harm.

### **CLASS REPRESENTATION ALLEGATIONS**

128. Plaintiff brings this nationwide class action on behalf of herself and on behalf of others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

129. The Nationwide Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows:

All United States residents whose Private Information was accessed or acquired during the data breach event that is the subject of the Notice of Data Breach that Defendant sent to Plaintiff and other Class Members on or around June 10, 2022 (the "Nationwide Class").

130. Excluded from the Class are Defendant's officers, directors, and employees; any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest; and the affiliates, legal representatives, attorneys, successors, heirs, and assigns of Defendant. Excluded also from the Class are Members of the judiciary to whom this case is assigned, their families and Members of their staff.

131. Numerosity, Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1): The Nationwide Class (the "Class") are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Defendant has identified hundreds of thousands of individuals whose Private Information may have been improperly accessed in the Data Breach, and the Class is apparently identifiable within Defendant's records. Defendant advised the United States Department of Health and Human Services that the Data Breach affected more than 1,100,000 individuals.

1           132. Commonality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3): Questions of law and fact  
2 common to the Classes exist and predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class  
3 Members. These include:

- 4           a. Whether Defendant unlawfully used, maintained, lost, or disclosed  
5           Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information;  
6  
7           b. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable  
8           security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and  
9           scope of the information compromised in the hacking incident and  
10          Data Breach;  
11  
12          c. Whether Defendant's data security systems prior to and during the  
13          hacking incident and Data Breach complied with applicable data  
14          security laws and regulations, *e.g.*, HIPAA;  
15  
16          d. Whether Defendant's data security systems prior to and during the  
17          Data Breach were consistent with industry standards;  
18  
19          e. Whether Defendant owed a duty to Class Members to safeguard  
20          their Private Information;  
21  
22          f. Whether Defendant breached its duty to Class Members to  
23          safeguard their Private Information;  
24  
25          g. Whether computer hackers obtained Class Members' Private  
26          Information in the Data Breach;  
27  
28          h. Whether Defendant knew or should have known that its data  
29          security systems and monitoring processes were deficient;

- i. Whether Defendant owed a duty to provide Plaintiff and Class Members notice of this Data Breach, and whether Defendant breached that duty to provide timely notice;
- j. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members suffered legally cognizable damages as a result of Defendant's misconduct;
- k. Whether Defendant's conduct was negligent;
- l. Whether Defendant's conduct was *per se* negligent;
- m. Whether Defendant's acts, inactions, and practices complained of herein amount to acts of intrusion upon seclusion under the law;
- n. Whether Defendant was unjustly enriched
- o. Whether Defendant's conduct violated federal law;
- p. Whether Defendant's conduct violated state law;
- q. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages, civil penalties, and/or punitive damages.

133. Common sources of evidence may also be used to demonstrate Defendant's unlawful conduct on a class-wide basis, including, but not limited to, documents and testimony about its data and cybersecurity measures (or lack thereof); testing and other methods that can prove Defendant's data and cybersecurity systems have been or remain inadequate; documents and testimony about the source, cause, and extent of the Data Breach; and documents and testimony about any remedial efforts undertaken as a result of the Data Breach.

1           134. Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3): Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of other  
2 Class Members because all had their PII compromised as a result of the Data Breach and due to  
3 Defendant's misfeasance.

4           135. Adequacy, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4): Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent  
5 and protect the interests of the Class Members in that he has no disabling conflicts of interest that  
6 would be antagonistic to those of the other Members of the Class. Plaintiffs seek no relief that is  
7 antagonistic or adverse to the Members of the Class and the infringement of the rights and the  
8 damages they has suffered are typical of other Class Members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel  
9 experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to prosecute this action  
10 vigorously.  
11

12           136. Predominance, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3). Defendant has engaged in a common  
13 course of conduct toward Plaintiff and Class Members, in that all the Plaintiff's and Class  
14 Members' data was stored on the same computer systems and unlawfully accessed in the same  
15 way. The common issues arising from Defendant's conduct affecting Class Members set out  
16 above predominate over any individualized issues. Adjudication of these common issues in a  
17 single action has important and desirable advantages of judicial economy.  
18

19           137. Superiority and Manageability, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3): The class litigation is an  
20 appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action  
21 treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the  
22 controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number of Class Members to prosecute their  
23 common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary  
24 duplication of evidence, effort, and expense that hundreds of individual actions would require.  
25  
26

1 Class action treatment will permit the adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain Class  
2 Members, who could not individually afford to litigate a complex claim against large  
3 corporations, like Defendant. Further, even for those Class Members who could afford to litigate  
4 such a claim, it would still be economically impractical and impose a burden on the courts.  
5

6 138. The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiffs and Class  
7 Members make the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and appropriate  
8 procedure to afford relief to Plaintiffs and Class Members for the wrongs alleged because  
9 Defendant would necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage since they would be able to  
10 exploit and overwhelm the limited resources of each individual Class Member with superior  
11 financial and legal resources; the costs of individual suits could unreasonably consume the  
12 amounts that would be recovered; proof of a common course of conduct to which Plaintiffs were  
13 exposed is representative of that experienced by the Class and will establish the right of each  
14 Class Member to recover on the cause of action alleged; and individual actions would create a  
15 risk of inconsistent results and would be unnecessary and duplicative of this litigation.  
16

17 139. The litigation of the claims brought herein is manageable. Defendant's uniform  
18 conduct, the consistent provisions of the relevant laws, and the ascertainable identities of Class  
19 Members demonstrates that there would be no significant manageability problems with  
20 prosecuting this lawsuit as a class action.  
21

22 140. Adequate notice can be given to Class Members directly using information  
23 maintained in Defendant's records.

24 141. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant may continue in its failure to  
25 properly secure the Private Information of Class Members, Defendant may continue to refuse to  
26

1 provide proper notification to Class Members regarding the Data Breach, and Defendant may  
2 continue to act unlawfully as set forth in this Complaint.

3 142. Further, Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to  
4 the Classes and, accordingly, final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with regard to  
5 the Class Members as a whole is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil  
6 Procedure.  
7

8 143. Likewise, particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) are appropriate for certification  
9 because such claims present only particular, common issues, the resolution of which would  
10 advance the disposition of this matter and the parties' interests therein. Such particular issues  
11 include, but are not limited to:

- 12 a. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to  
13 exercise due care in collecting, storing, using, and safeguarding their PII;  
14  
15 b. Whether Defendant breached a legal duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to  
16 exercise due care in collecting, storing, using, and safeguarding their PII;  
17  
18 c. Whether Defendant failed to comply with its own policies and applicable laws,  
19 regulations, and industry standards relating to data security;  
20  
21 d. Whether an implied contract existed between Defendant on the one hand, and  
22 Plaintiffs and Class Members on the other, and the terms of that implied contract;  
23  
24 e. Whether Defendant breached the implied contract;  
25  
26 f. Whether Defendant adequately and accurately informed Plaintiffs and Class  
Members that their PII had been compromised;

- g. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information compromised in the Data Breach;
- h. Whether Defendant engaged in unfair, unlawful, or deceptive practices by failing to safeguard the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members; and,
- i. Whether Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential, and/or nominal damages, and/or injunctive relief as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct.

144. Defendant acted on grounds that apply generally to the Class as a whole, so that Class certification and the corresponding relief sought are appropriate on a Class-wide basis.

145. Finally, all members of the proposed Class are readily ascertainable. Defendant has access to Class Members' names and addresses affected by the Data Breach. Class Members have already been preliminarily identified and sent notice of the Data Breach by Defendant.

## CAUSES OF ACTION

### FIRST COUNT

#### **Violation of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86.010 *et seq.*) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

146. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

147. The Washington State Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020 (the "CPA") prohibits any "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in the conduct of any trade or commerce as those terms are described by the CPA and relevant case law.

148. Defendant is a "person" as described in RWC 19.86.010(1).



1           149. Defendant engages in “trade” and “commerce” as described in RWC 19.86.010(2)  
2 in that they engage in the sale of services and commerce directly and indirectly affecting the  
3 people of the State of Washington.

4           150. Defendant is headquartered in Washington; its strategies, decision-making, and  
5 commercial transactions originate in Washington; most of its key operations and employees reside,  
6 work, and make company decisions (including data security decisions) in Washington; and  
7 Defendant and many of its employees are part of the people of the State of Washington.

8           151. In the course of conducting their business, Defendant committed “unfair acts or  
9 practices” by, inter alia, knowingly failing to design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee,  
10 manage, monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies, procedures,  
11 protocols, and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and Class  
12 Members’ Private Information. Plaintiff and Class Members reserve the right to allege other  
13 violations of law by Defendant constituting other unlawful business acts or practices. As  
14 described above, Defendant’s unfair acts and practices ongoing and continue to this date.

15           152. Defendant’s conduct was also deceptive. Defendant failed to timely notify and  
16 concealing from Plaintiff and Class Members the unauthorized release and disclosure of their  
17 Private Information. If Plaintiff and Class Members had been notified in an appropriate fashion,  
18 and had the information not been hidden from them, they could have taken precautions to  
19 safeguard and protect their Private Information, medical information, and identities.

20           153. Defendant’s above-described “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in violation  
21 effects the public interest because it is substantially injurious to persons, had the capacity to  
22 injure other persons, and has the capacity to injure other persons.

1           154. The gravity of Defendant's wrongful conduct outweighs any alleged benefits  
2 attributable to such conduct. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant's  
3 legitimate business interests other than engaging in the above-described wrongful conduct.

4           155. Defendant's above-described unfair and deceptive acts and practices directly and  
5 proximately caused injury to Plaintiff and Class Members' business and property. Plaintiff and  
6 Class Members have suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual damages and injury in the form  
7 of, inter alia, (1) an imminent, immediate and the continuing increased risk of identity theft,  
8 identity fraud and medical fraud—risks justifying expenditures for protective and remedial  
9 services for which he or she is entitled to compensation; (2) invasion of privacy; (3) breach of  
10 the confidentiality of his or her Private Information; (5) deprivation of the value of his or her  
11 Private Information, for which there is a well-established national and international market; (6)  
12 the financial and temporal cost of monitoring credit, monitoring financial accounts, and  
13 mitigating damages; and/or (7) investment of substantial time and money to monitoring and  
14 remediating the harm inflicted upon them

15           156. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendant will continue to engage in the above-  
16 described wrongful conduct and more data breaches will occur. Plaintiff, therefore, on behalf of  
17 herself, Class Members, and the general public, also seeks restitution and an injunction  
18 prohibiting Defendant from continuing such wrongful conduct, and requiring Defendant to  
19 modify their corporate culture and design, adopt, implement, control, direct, oversee, manage,  
20 monitor and audit appropriate data security processes, controls, policies, procedures protocols,  
21 and software and hardware systems to safeguard and protect the Private Information entrusted to  
22 it.  
23  
24  
25  
26

1           157. Plaintiff, on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members, also seeks to recover  
 2 actual damages sustained by each class member together with the costs of the suit, including  
 3 reasonable attorney fees. In addition, Plaintiff, on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Members,  
 4 requests that this Court use its discretion, pursuant to RCW 19.86.090, to increase the damages  
 5 award for each class member by three times the actual damages sustained not to exceed  
 6 \$25,000.00 per class member.  
 7

## 8           **SECOND COUNT**

### 9           **Negligence**

#### 10          **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

11           158. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all  
 12 previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

13           159. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class members.

14           160. Defendant knowingly collected, came into possession of, and maintained  
 15 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information, and had a duty to exercise reasonable care in  
 16 safeguarding, securing and protecting such information from being compromised, lost, stolen,  
 17 misused, and/or disclosed to unauthorized parties.

18           161. Defendant had, and continues to have, a duty to timely disclose that Plaintiff's  
 19 and Class Members' Private Information within their possession was compromised and precisely  
 20 the type(s) of information that were compromised.  
 21

22           162. Defendant had a duty to have procedures in place to detect and prevent the loss or  
 23 unauthorized dissemination of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.

24           163. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and Class Members to provide data  
 25 security consistent with industry standards, applicable standards of care from statutory authority  
 26

1 like HIPAA and Section 5 of the FTC Act, and other requirements discussed herein, and to  
2 ensure that their systems and networks, and the personnel responsible for them, adequately  
3 protected the Private Information.

4 164. Defendant's duty of care to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of  
5 the special relationship that existed between Defendant and its Class Members, which is  
6 recognized by laws and regulations including but not limited to HIPAA, as well as common law.  
7 Defendant was in a position to ensure that its systems were sufficient to protect against the  
8 foreseeable risk of harm to Class Members from a data breach.

9 165. Defendant's duty to use reasonable security measures under HIPAA required  
10 Defendant to "reasonably protect" confidential data from "any intentional or unintentional use or  
11 disclosure" and to "have in place appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards  
12 to protect the privacy of protected health information." 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1). Some or all of  
13 the medical information at issue in this case constitutes "protected health information" within the  
14 meaning of HIPAA.

15 166. In addition, Defendant had a duty to employ reasonable security measures under  
16 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which prohibits "unfair . . .  
17 practices in or affecting commerce," including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the  
18 unfair practice of failing to use reasonable measures to protect confidential data.

19 167. Defendant's duty to use reasonable care in protecting confidential data arose not  
20 only as a result of the statutes and regulations described above, but also because Defendant is  
21 bound by industry standards to protect confidential Private Information.

1           168. Defendant systematically failed to provide adequate security for data in its  
2 possession.

3           169. The specific negligent acts and omissions committed by Defendant include, but  
4 are not limited to, the following:  
5

- 6           a. Upon information and belief, mishandling emails, so as to allow for  
7 unauthorized person(s) to access Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private  
8 Information;  
9           b. Failing to adopt, implement, and maintain adequate security measures to  
10 safeguard Class Members' Private Information;  
11           c. Failing to adequately monitor the security of their networks and systems;  
12           d. Failure to periodically ensure that their computer systems and networks had  
13 plans in place to maintain reasonable data security safeguards.  
14

15           170. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached their duty to  
16 Plaintiff and Class members by failing to exercise reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding  
17 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information within Defendant's possession.

18           171. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached their duty to  
19 Plaintiff and Class members by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and  
20 prevent dissemination of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.  
21

22           172. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached their duty to  
23 timely disclose to Plaintiff and Class Members that the Private Information within Defendant's  
24 possession might have been compromised and precisely the type of information compromised.  
25  
26

1           173. It was foreseeable that Defendant's failure to use reasonable measures to protect  
2 Plaintiff and Class Members' Private Information would result in injury to Plaintiff and Class  
3 Members. Further, the breach of security was reasonably foreseeable given the known high  
4 frequency of cyberattacks and data breaches in the medical industry.  
5

6           174. It was foreseeable that the failure to adequately safeguard Plaintiff and Class  
7 Members' Private Information would result in injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members.

8           175. Defendant's breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and Class Members caused  
9 Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to be compromised.

10           176. As a result of Defendant's ongoing failure to notify Plaintiff and Class Members  
11 regarding what type of Private Information has been compromised, Plaintiff and Class Members  
12 are unable to take the necessary precautions to mitigate damages by preventing future fraud.  
13

14           177. Defendant's breaches of duty caused Plaintiff and Class Members to suffer from  
15 identity theft, loss of time and money to monitor their finances for fraud, and loss of control over  
16 their Private Information.

17           178. As a result of Defendant's negligence and breach of duties, Plaintiff and Class  
18 Members are in danger of imminent harm in that their Private Information, which is still in the  
19 possession of third parties, will be used for fraudulent purposes.  
20

21           179. Plaintiff seeks the award of actual damages on behalf of the Class. Plaintiff seeks  
22 injunctive relief on behalf of the Class in the form of an order (1) compelling Defendant to  
23 institute appropriate data collection and safeguarding methods and policies with regard to patient  
24 information; and (2) compelling Defendant to provide detailed and specific disclosure of what  
25 types of Private Information have been compromised as a result of the data breach.  
26

**THIRD COUNT**  
**Negligence *per se***  
**(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class)**

180. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

181. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45), Defendant had a duty to provide fair and adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff and Class Members' Private Information.

182. Plaintiff and Class Members are within the class of persons that the FTCA was intended to protect.

183. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the FTCA was intended to guard against. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and the Class.

184. Pursuant to HIPAA (42 U.S.C. § 1302d, et seq.), Defendant had a duty to implement reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information.

185. Pursuant to HIPAA, Defendant had a duty to render the electronic PHI it maintained unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals, as specified in the HIPAA Security Rule by "the use of an algorithmic process to transform data into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a confidential process or key" (45 C.F.R. § 164.304 definition of encryption).

1           186. Plaintiff and Class Members are within the class of persons that the HIPAA was  
2 intended to protect.

3           187. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm that  
4 HIPAA was intended to guard against. The Federal Health and Human Services' Office for Civil  
5 Rights ("OCR") has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of their  
6 failure to employ reasonable data security measures relating to protected health information,  
7 caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and the Class.

8           188. Defendant breached their duties to Plaintiff and Class Members under the Federal  
9 Trade Commission Act and HIPAA, by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer  
10 systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private  
11 Information.

12           189. Defendant's failure to comply with applicable laws and regulations constitutes  
13 negligence per se.

14           190. But for Defendant's wrongful and negligent breach of its duties owed to Plaintiff  
15 and Class Members, Plaintiff and Class Members would not have been injured.

16           191. The injury and harm suffered by Plaintiff and Class Members was the reasonably  
17 foreseeable result of Defendant's breach of their duties. Defendant knew or should have known  
18 that it was failing to meet its duties, and that Defendant's breach would cause Plaintiff and Class  
19 Members to experience the foreseeable harms associated with the exposure and compromise of  
20 their Private Information.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26



193. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

195. Defendant's relationship with Plaintiff and Class Members was governed by terms and expectations that Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information would be collected, stored, and protected in confidence, and would not be disclosed to unauthorized third parties.

197. Plaintiff and Class Members also provided their Private Information to Defendant with the explicit and implicit understandings that Defendant would take precautions to protect that Private Information from unauthorized disclosure.

1           198. Defendant voluntarily received in confidence Plaintiff's and the Class Members'  
2 Private Information with the understanding that Private Information would not be disclosed or  
3 disseminated to the public or any unauthorized third parties.

4           199. Due to Defendant's failure to prevent and avoid the Data Breach from occurring,  
5 Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information was disclosed and misappropriated to  
6 unauthorized third parties beyond Plaintiff's and the Class Members' confidence, and without  
7 their express permission.  
8

9           200. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant's actions and/or omissions, Plaintiff  
10 and Class Members have suffered damages.

11           201. But for Defendant's disclosure of Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private  
12 Information in violation of the parties' understanding of confidence, their Private Information  
13 would not have been compromised, stolen, viewed, accessed, and used by unauthorized third  
14 parties. Defendant's Data Breach was the direct and legal cause of the theft of Plaintiff's and the  
15 Class Members' Private Information as well as the resulting damages.  
16

17           202. The injury and harm Plaintiff and Class Members suffered was the reasonably  
18 foreseeable result of Defendant's unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff's and the Class Members'  
19 Private Information. Defendant knew or should have known its methods of accepting and  
20 securing Plaintiff's and the Class Members' Private Information was inadequate as it relates to,  
21 at the very least, securing servers and other equipment containing Plaintiff's and the Class  
22 Members' Private Information.  
23

24           203. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breach of its confidence with  
25 Plaintiff and the Class, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and will suffer injury,  
26

1 including but not limited to: (i) actual identity theft; (ii) the loss of the opportunity how their PII  
2 and PHI is used; (iii) the compromise, publication, and/or theft of their PII and PHI; (iv) out-of-  
3 pocket expenses associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, tax  
4 fraud, and/or unauthorized use of their Private Information; (v) lost opportunity costs associated  
5 with effort expended and the loss of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual  
6 present and future consequences of the Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts spent  
7 researching how to prevent, detect, contest, and recover from tax fraud and identity theft; (vi)  
8 costs associated with placing freezes on credit reports; (vii) the continued risk to their Private  
9 Information, which remain in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized  
10 disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect  
11 the Private Information of current and former patients and their beneficiaries and dependents;  
12 and (viii) present and future costs in terms of time, effort, and money that will be expended to  
13 prevent, detect, contest, and repair the impact of the Private Information compromised as a result  
14 of the Data Breach for the remainder of the lives of Plaintiff and the Class.

17 204. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's breaches of confidence, Plaintiff  
18 and Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm,  
19 including, but not limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and  
20 non-economic losses.

### 22 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

23 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, prays for  
24 relief as follows:  
25  
26

- A. For an Order certifying this case as a class action and appointing Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel to represent the Class;
- B. For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information, and from refusing to issue prompt, complete and accurate disclosures to Plaintiff and Class Members;
- C. For equitable relief compelling Defendant to utilize appropriate methods and policies with respect to consumer data collection, storage, and safety, and to disclose with specificity the type of PII and PHI compromised during the Data Breach;
- D. For equitable relief requiring restitution and disgorgement of the revenues wrongfully retained as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;
- E. Ordering Defendant to pay for not less than three years of credit monitoring services for Plaintiff and the Class;
- F. Ordering Defendant to disseminate individualized notice of the Data Breach to all Class Members;
- G. For an award of actual damages, compensatory damages, statutory damages, and statutory penalties, in an amount to be determined, as allowable by law;
- H. For an award of attorneys' fees and costs, and any other expense, including expert witness fees;
- I. Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded; and
- J. Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury of all claims so triable.

Dated: June 16, 2022

**TOUSLEY BRAIN STEPHENS PLLC**

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*\*Pro Hac Vice Application forthcoming*

*Counsel for Plaintiff and Putative Class Members*